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A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output
is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which
the Agent is supposed to exert eﬀort every period, receives a constant eﬃciency wage and
no feedback until he is ﬁred. The optimal contract for a ﬁnite horizon is characterized, and
shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization
sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor
(δ).F o r t h e i n ﬁnite horizon case a family of ﬁxed interval review contracts is characterized
and shown to achieve ﬁr s tb e s ta sδ → 1. The optimal contract when δ< <1 is partially
characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of eﬃciency wages and the
threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally,
Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There are many environments in which the Principal might privately observe a signal of the Agent’s
output or performance. For example, if an analyst prepares a research report for his boss, both can
see how many pages the report has, but how good or valuable does the boss ﬁnd the report? This is
his private information. The Principal might also privately receive reports from a client regarding
the Agent’s performance. In teamwork environments, the supervisor might elicit conﬁdential reports
from co-workers to better assess an employee’s performance. Some procurement relationships also
naturally ﬁt this framework. For example, if a supplier ships goods across the Atlantic, the condition
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1in which those goods are received may be privately observed by the buyer. Our goal in this paper
is to characterize optimal contractual arrangements in such environments with a moral hazard
problem on the Agent’s side and private information on the Principal’s side.
We show in this paper how many features observed in labor markets — such as wage compression,
involuntary unemployment, eﬃciency wages, review periods and tournaments— show up as alterna-
tives to overcome the Agent’s moral hazard when the Principal monitors the output privately.
MacLeod (2003) ﬁrst analyzed a one-shot model of a Principal who privately observes the per-
formance of an Agent (who, in turn, ﬁrst privately chooses his eﬀort level). We extend MacLeod’s
analysis to games of arbitrary ﬁnite length and inﬁnite horizons. For the ﬁnite horizon case, we
reinforce MacLeod’s results that incentives cannot be provided with a balanced-budget contract.
Burning resources is necessary in order simultaneously to provide incentives for the Agent to exert
eﬀort and for the Principal to report output truthfully. The intuition for this result is that although
we have to punish the Agent for bad outcome realizations, we cannot let the Principal beneﬁtf r o m
it. Otherwise, he would want to lie and claim the outcome was low.
We characterize the optimal contract for a ﬁnite horizon and show that money burning will take
place only at the end of the game and only if the Principal observes the worst output sequence.
Furthermore, in the optimal contract, the only binding incentive compatibility constraint for the
Agent is the one that guarantees he will exert eﬀort in the ﬁrst period. We then proceed to show
that the total expected amount of resources to be burnt is independent of both the horizon and
the discount factor. Finally, we show that it is optimal to pool all periods together before an
evaluation. This is not due to the strength of the statistical test used to determine deviations but
rather, because once incentives are provided for the Agent to exert eﬀort in the ﬁrst period, at no
additional cost we can get him to work the rest of the periods.
In the second part of the paper we consider the case when the horizon is inﬁnite. One motivation
to study this case is that it allows us to endogenize money burning through termination. Termi-
nation burns the remaining surplus that could have been generated by the relationship. Explicitly
studying how value is destroyed in the repeated game also raises several important issues that were
not present in the ﬁnite horizon model. The fact that there is no ‘last’ period and that all the
burning can no longer take place at the end of the game introduces new and important aspects
of the problem. The question of the optimal timing for the release of information no longer has a
straightforward solution. Even if the Principal sends no explicit messages to the Agent, the sim-
p l ef a c tt h a th eh a sn o tb e e nﬁred provides the Agent with some information about the outcome
realizations. This adds a series of new concerns when determining the optimal ﬁring decisions.
From a theoretical perspective, this is an inﬁnitely repeated game with private monitoring.
2Unfortunately, such games lack a tractable recursive structure. There is no equivalent to the tools
developed by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) or Sannikov (2004) applicable to these types of
games. Hence, characterizing the equilibrium value set (or even a given equilibrium) poses a great
challenge.1
In light of these diﬃculties, Levin (2003), who ﬁrst analyzed the inﬁnite horizon problem, re-
stricted his attention to contracts with the "Full Review Property". This property restricts the
analysis to equilibria in which the Principal truthfully reveals the outcome to the Agent every
period. Hence, the Principal does not maintain any private information from period to period. We
show that these contracts are generally suboptimal, especially, when players are patient. We expand
the allowable class of contracts by studying T-period review contracts: the Principal reviews the
Agent’s performance only at predetermined ﬁxed intervals of length T. The length of the review is
in turn endogenously determined. We are able to establish that these contracts are asymptotically
eﬃcient: as the players become very patient, we can obtain per period payoﬀs arbitrarily close to
the ﬁr s tb e s tp a y o ﬀs (the corresponding contracts have longer-and-longer review periods as δ → 1).
This result cannot be achieved within the family of contracts with the "Full Review Property".
The next step is to analyze arbitrary contracts. First, we show that in order to characterize
the equilibrium value set, we can restrict our attention to a speciﬁc class of contracts. This class
entails the Agent exerting eﬀort every period, receiving a ﬁxed eﬃciency wage and no bonuses nor
feedback on his past performance until he is ﬁred.
These results resonate well with the evidence presented by Baker et al. (1994) that only 5% of
workers claim to receive performance pay in the form of commissions or piece rate contracts and
that only 25% claim to have bonuses based on subjective measures of performance. Also consistent
with our results is Prendergast (1999) who documents the reluctance of managers to rate employees,
especially when it impacts compensation.
Then we use a variation approach to provide further characterization of an optimal contract.
This method consists in showing that if a given contract does not have certain properties, we can
modify it slightly to obtain a weak improvement. This allows us to sidestep some of the diﬃculties
associated with the absence of a tractable recursive representation; in particular, the fact that
arbitrarily complex deviations by the Agent must be considered.2
In an optimal contract, at every point in time there is a set of histories of outcomes observed
by the Principal for which he re-employs the Agent with certainty and a set of histories for which
he ﬁres the Agent with certainty. Although, in general, the solution will entail no randomizations,
1See Kandori (2002) for a discussion of the diﬃculties associated with the analysis of private monitoring games.
2The main diﬃculty is that in general it is not suﬃcient to check only one-step deviations by the agent.
3we cannot rule out the existence of histories for which termination is random. We are able to
construct a partial ordering over histories and show that the termination decisions exhibit memory.
Outcomes from past periods aﬀect termination decisions for the whole future. Therefore, optimal
contracts cannot be replicated by short-term contracts.
Finally, we show that organizational design features such as hierarchies or tournaments could
provide an alternative solution to the problem. For example, if the Principal had another Agent, a
tournament could be set up and used to provide incentives without the need to burn any resources.
The best way to relate this paper to the more general literature on moral hazard problems
is to classify the models along the following two properties. Is the output veriﬁable by a third
party? Is the output common knowledge between the Principal and the Agent? The ﬁrst papers
in contract theory such as Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) focused on the case in which the
output was common knowledge and, more importantly, could be veriﬁed by a court of law. They
studied static problems and their main concern was the risk sharing vs. incentives trade-oﬀ.T h e
assumption that complex output measures such as customer care, can be veriﬁed by the courts is
questionable. Furthermore, for multitasking environments, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) have
shown that if only some measures of performance are veriﬁable, writing contracts only contingent
on these measures could lead to perverse incentives and gaming of the system by the Agents. The
issue of how to provide incentives on unveriﬁable measures of performance was addressed by Bull
(1987) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989). They showed that if the performance is common
knowledge, continuation values in the relationship could be used to provide incentives. Pearce and
Stacchetti (1998) further showed how the veriﬁable and non-veriﬁable measures of performance
could be combined in optimal contracts. Removing the assumption of common knowledge over
performance leads to the work of MacLeod (2003), Levin (2003) and this paper.
This paper is also related to the literature on eﬃciency wages. The use of eﬃciency wages in
macro models such as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) has been criticized for lacking proper microeco-
nomic foundations. We provide such foundations and show that the contracts studied by Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) are actually optimal in an environment where the Principal privately observes
the Agent’s output.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 shows
that the analysis can be restricted to contracts in which the Principal pays a constant wage, the
Agent exerts eﬀort until he is ﬁred and there is no communication. Section 4 studies the ﬁnite
horizon problem. Section 5 extends the analysis to the inﬁnite horizon. Possible organizational
design solutions are studied in section 6. Section 7 explores extensions of the basic model to allow
for random eﬀort. Finally, conclusions and suggestions for future research can be found in Section
8.
42 The Model
Two risk neutral players, an Agent and a Principal are matched at time zero and have the opportu-
nity to trade at dates t ∈ {0,1,...,T}. We will consider both the case where T is ﬁnite and T = ∞.
At t =0 , the Principal and the Agent agree on a compensation schedule and a termination policy.3
Part of this agreement is determined by a long term contract ω signed at time zero. Its terms de-
pend only on veriﬁable information that is enforceable by a third party. The rest of the agreement
corresponds to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (a self-enforcing contract) of the post-contractual
repeated game Γω we now describe.
The ﬁgure below depicts the order of play in each period of the game while the Agent is still
employed. Informally, the timing is as follows: ﬁrst, the Agent chooses whether to exert eﬀort or
not, conditional on his information. Next, the Principal privately observes the output realization
yt and a random variable φt. He then chooses a message mt to send to the Agent. This message is
veriﬁable and implies a bonus bt he must pay to the Agent. The Principal also pays a base wage
wt that is not contingent on output but can be contingent on a public randomization device xt.
Finally, simultaneous decisions are made in every period on whether to continue the relationship
into the future or not.4
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Given the particular information structure of the game we will deﬁne three diﬀerent histories.
First, we have the set of veriﬁable histories HV
t where t denotes the length of the history. A typical




. Superscripts are used to denote sequences of realizations
and subscripts are used to denote a particular realization. kt is an indicator function that equals
one if the Agent decides to stay in the job at time t. Similarly, At is an indicator function that
equals one if the Principal decides to continue employing the Agent at time t. The exogenous public
randomization device xt ∼ U [0,1] is independent of all other elements of the game and identically
distributed over time. Next, we have the set of Agent’s private histories HA
t . A typical element in





. Finally, we have the set of Principal’s private histories HP
t . At y p i c a l
3The way the surplus is divided is not important for the analysis so we won’t model it explicitly. We think about
it as the outcome of some eﬃcient bargaining.
4The assumption that these decisions are simultaneous could be easily modiﬁed without aﬀecting the results.





. Where φt ∼ U [0,1] is independent of all other elements of




We can now formally deﬁne an enforceable contract ω ∈ Ω as two sequences of functions: base






× [0,1] → R for t=0 ,...,T . 5
Note that this formulation of the wages allows for severance pay. Bonuses are additionally functions
of the messages sent by the Principal:
bt : HV
t−1 × Mt × [0,1] → R+ for t=0 ,...,T .
The assumption that b ≥ 0 is without loss of generality since we could always rescale {wt}; also,






This is useful because we want to allow the Principal to send messages at no cost, for example if
those messages contain no information.
Each period if still employed, the Agent has a choice of exerting eﬀort or not, et : HA
t−1 → {0,1}.7
We assume no eﬀort is costless and exerting eﬀort is costly. Formally, we denote the cost of eﬀort
by c(e) where, c(0) = 0 and c(1) = c>0.
Output is also binary, yt ∈ Yt = {L,H} and is privately observed by the Principal. Its realizations
are stochastic and depend on the level of eﬀort in the following way:
p 1 – p e=1
q 1 – q e=0
y=H y=L P(y|e)
p 1 – p e=1
q 1 – q e=0
y=H y=L P(y|e)
We assume that eﬀort increases the likelihood of a high outcome:
1 >p>q>0 .
We use the common support assumption since it facilitates some of the discussion, in particular
when considering oﬀ equilibrium behaviour. The cases p =1and q =0are discussed later.
5The ×[0,1] stands for the public randomization device xt.














7We consider mixed strategies for the Agent in Section 7.
6The expected output conditional on no eﬀort is zero.8 Lastly, the per period expected surplus
from exerting eﬀort will be denoted by s and assumed to be strictly positive:
E[y | e =1 ]− c = s>0 .
Upon observing the realization of yt and φt, the Principal sends a public and veriﬁable announce-
ment mt, where mt : HP
t−1 ×Yt ×[0,1] → Mt. The set Mt is the algebra generated by Y t.9 That is,
the Principal can choose to reveal only partially or not reveal at all the history of outcomes to the
Agent.
The last event in each period is the simultaneous decision whether to continue the relationship or
terminate it. Termination occurs if at least one of the parties decides to terminate the relationship.
The Agent’s decision whether to stay or not is denoted kt where, kt : HA
t−1 ×et ×xt ×Mt → {0,1}.
The Principal oﬀe r st h eA g e n tt or e m a i ne m p l o y e dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yat where, at : HP
t−1 × Yt ×
Mt × [0,1] → [0,1].10 If termination occurs both parties receive their outside options which are
normalized to zero.11 If a relationship has been terminated, the parties never trade again (the
Agent exerts no more eﬀort for the Principal) only severance pay transfers may still take place.
Let σA
ω =[ {et},{kt}] denote the Agent’s strategy conditional on having signed contract ω.
Similarly let σP
ω =[ {mt},{at}] denote the Principal’s strategy conditional on having signed contract






to denote a strategy pair. The full strategies for the players have an
additional element χi i = A,P which denotes the choice of accepting a given contract ω with the
self-enforcing agreement (to be deﬁned in the next section) that σω ∈ ΣA
ω × ΣP
ω will be played in
the continuation game. χi : Ω × ΣA
ω × ΣP






. Denote by σ a strategy proﬁle pair
¡
σA,σP¢
of the whole game.
We use δ ∈ (0,1) to denote the discount factor which is assumed to be the same for both players.




δt(wt + bt − c(et))
8This is not purely a normalization since it implies that no eﬀort no pay is identical to termination in terms of
the surplus generated.
9Alternatively: mt : H
P
t−1 × Yt × [0,1] → ∆Mt. The set Mt is the algebra generated by Y
t and ∆Mt denotes the
simplex over Mt.
10Note, that we allow for mixed termination strategies for the principal but not for the agent. This is shown in
Section 3 not to be a restricitve assumption.
11We could embed this model into a matching model such as that in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). What we need is
for there to be quasi rents perceived when matched.




δt(yt − wt − bt)
If the players follow a strategy proﬁle σ we can deﬁne the values for the players from starting
































I ft h eP l a y e r sa r ef o l l o w i n gσ then the Principal knows both Ft and Vt. Note that if the Agent
deviates, the Principal will be mistaken on his evaluations of F and V.13 The Agent knows neither
since they depend on the Principal’s private information. He forms and expectation of Vt based on

















An equilibrium of the post contractual game Γωconsists of:
















Deﬁnition 1 Best responses:
As t r a t e g yσA
ω ∈ ΣA
ω is a best response to σP
ω after history hA
t−1 if:
σA












Similarly, a strategy σP
ω ∈ ΣP
ω is a best response to σA
ω after history hP
t−1 if:
σP












12This formulation implicitly rules out the possibility that part of the wage paid could be destroyed before it is
received by the Agent. We relax this assumption in Section 4.
13As we will explain later this is one of reasons why in general it won’t be suﬃcient to only consider one step
deviations for the Agent.
14The opponents type is deﬁned by his private information.







and beliefs µA,µ P form a Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of Γω if and only if:
• σ∗A
ω is a best response to σ∗P
ω after every history hA
t−1 and σ∗P
ω is a best response to σ∗A
ω after
every history hP
t−1 given the beliefs µA,µ P.
• The beliefs µA,µ P are consistent with σ∗
ω and updated using Baye’s rule, when possible.
Additionally, an equilibrium for the complete game requires that individual rationality con-
straints for signing the employment contract ω at time zero are satisﬁed.
3 Equilibrium Properties
In this section we provide some general properties for any equilibrium (ω,σ∗
ω). First, we show in
Proposition 1 that all equilibria require surplus to be destroyed if in a given period the Agent was
supposed to exert eﬀort but a low outcome realization is observed. Next, we show that in order
to analyze the possible equilibrium values we can concentrate in a suﬃcient class of contracts. In
particular, for any equilibrium contract (ω,σ∗
ω) there exists a payoﬀ equivalent contract in which
the Agent exerts eﬀort every period and he is paid a constant wage (no bonuses) until he is
ﬁred. Furthermore, it is suﬃcient to focus on contracts in which the Principal does not send any
informative messages to the Agent.
The following deﬁnitions facilitate our analysis.








is the promised continuation value to
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9Deﬁnition 4 Given σω and a history hV





=1 , we say that σA
ω is incentive












































for all ˜ σA
ω such that ˜ σA
ω ≡ σA






Surplus Destruction on Equilibrium Path





































i.e. the expected payoﬀ to the Agent is strictly increasing in the output when the Agent is supposed
to exert eﬀort.
Proof. Follows from the fact that eﬀort increases the likelihood of yt = H.
Deﬁnition 5 Given σAand ω we say σP























for all ˜ σP
ω such that ˜ σP
ω ≡ σP
ω for all τ<t . 16






ω is incentive compatible for the Principal then
σP
ω is a best response to σA given ω.
Proof. Follows directly from the deﬁnition of best response. There is no ˜ σP
ω ∈ ΣP
ω that can achieve
a higher value for the Principal.
Technically, we are abusing the deﬁnition of best response slightly because we are not explicitly
considering detectable deviations. On the other hand these deviations could be delt with in a simple
way.
15Note that ˜ σ
A
ω can include arbitrary future deviations both in the eﬀort and in the termination, but agrees with
equilibrium until t − 1.
16In words, ˜ σ
P
ω is consistent with σ
P
ω up to t − 1 but can include arbitrary future deviations both in the messages
a n di nt h et e r m i n a t i o n .






































and that yt = L is realized.
Now, consider the alternative strategy ˜ σP
ω for the Principal. ˜ σP
ω follows σP
ω e x c e p tt h a ti ti m p l i e s
t h es a m ea c t i o n sa sσP
ω for histories with yt = L as it does for histories where yt = H. This deviation
is undetectable by the Agent and leads to an improvement for the Principal.17






































Lemmas 1 and 3 imply that for any strategy pair σ∗ and history hV






=1 , the Agent’s continuation value v+
t must depend on the outcome but the Principal’s
continuation value F+
t must be equal after either outcome.
Proposition 1 Providing incentives for high eﬀort requires that in expectation some surplus be




















































Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas (1) and (3). Adding equations (1) and (2) delivers (3).
The destruction of value after a low outcome is necessary to have contracts in which the Agent’s
continuation value is contingent on the realization of outcome while leaving the Principal indiﬀerent.
This result extends Proposition 2 in MacLeod (2003) to games of arbitrary horizon.
When dealing with a risk-neutral agent in an environment in which output is veriﬁable a contract
making the Agent the residual claimant could be written and it would deliver ﬁrst best. Here
those types of contracts cannot work because the Principal would always claim output was low.
Furthermore, there is no contract that can deliver ﬁrst best.
17For the case when p =1and q>0. We have to be careful when et =1because now the Agent can detect a
deviation if the Principal claims yt = L.
11Corollary 1 The ﬁrst best is not achievable for δ<1.
Proof. First note that the unconstrained optimum has the Agent exerting eﬀort every period. By
Proposition 1 if the Agent is to exert eﬀort, there must exist some value burning which is ineﬃcient.
Suﬃcient Class of Contracts
Next we present a series of Lemmas that are used to prove Theorem 1, the main result in this
section.
Lemma 4 For any contract [ω,σ∗] that generates values V and F there is a payoﬀ-equivalent
contract [˜ ω,˜ σ∗] such that for any history hV






are independent of the outcome yt.
Proof. Suppose the Principal conditioned his action on yt. Now, instead let him condition his
strategy ˜ σP on φt in the following way: if φt <qlet the Principal take the same actions that he did
for σP when yt = H and if φt >qtake the same actions he did for σP when yt = L. The Principal
had to be indiﬀerent between the outcomes of yt by Lemma 3 hence he will not have incentives to
deviate from ˜ σ if he didn’t have incentives to deviate from σ. If the Agent follows the equilibrium






=0the incentives to deviate in later or earlier periods are unchanged. If he





=1he is not aﬀecting future payoﬀs nor obtaining any
information hence such deviation costs him c without any beneﬁt.
In words, to induce no eﬀort we don’t need to provide any incentives to the Agent. Therefore, we
can always make his payoﬀ unconditional of the outcome without inducing him to put the eﬀort.
Deﬁnition 6 A contract [ω,σ∗] is an input based compensation contract if bt+wt = E [yt|et] forallt>
0
Lemma 5 (Input based pay) For every contract [ω,σ∗] that generates values V and F there
exists a payoﬀ equivalent input based compensation contract [˜ ω,˜ σ∗].
Proof. Modify [ω,σ∗] in the following way: let ˜ bt +˜ wt = E [yt|et] for all t > 0 and ˜ w0 =
E [y0|e0] − F. Also, let ˜ at = atkt and ˜ kt =1∀t. This changes imply that the Principal gets F as in
the initial contract but also, that for all t the Principal’s continuation value is zero (equal to his
outside option). Therefore, there are no incentive issues having the Principal, who is indiﬀerent on
whether to terminate or not, do all the termination. Additionally, there are no incentive problems
regarding the principal’s announcements. By construction, his announcements might change eﬀort
12level and compensation, but they do not change his expected surplus. The Agent won’t want to
deviate with respect to {˜ k} since terminating when he is not supposed to, would make him worse
oﬀ as he gets all the surplus in the continuation game. Lemma 4 implies we only need to check
that there will be no deviations with respect to eﬀort for those histories where eﬀort is supposed
to be exerted. Note that under the original contract, when the Agent was supposed to exert eﬀort
there had to be value burning in case of a bad outcome to ensure that the right incentives were
provided for the Agent to exert eﬀort. We showed already that the new contract will destroy the
same amount of value after the same histories than the original contract, hence the Agent will have
the same incentives to exert eﬀort under the new contract as he had under the old.
Deﬁnition 7 A contract [ω,σ∗] is a termination contract if it is an input based compensation
contract and the Agent exerts eﬀort every period until termination.
Lemma 6 (Termination) For any input based compensation contract [ω,σ∗] that generates values
V and F there is a payoﬀ equivalent termination contract [˜ ω,˜ σ∗].
Proof. First we will use Lemma 4t ot r a n s f o r m[ω,σ∗] into [ˆ ω,ˆ σ∗]. N o t et h a tt h i si m p l i e st h a t
the destruction of value that is produced by having the Agent exert no eﬀort after history hV
t−1
for a period is independent of yt. When there is a period of no eﬀort, value is being destroyed











δ we destroy in expectation the same amount of value. Finally, we
must adjust all strategies by one period since we are eliminating the slack period.
This shows that incentives for the Agent to exert eﬀort can be provided via eﬃciency wages and
the threat of termination.
Deﬁnition 8 At e r m i n a t i o nc o n t r a c t[ω,σ∗] i san oc o m m u n i c a t i o nc o n t r a c ti ﬀ the messages mt
are completely uninformative ∀ t.
Lemma 7 (No communication) For any termination contract [ω,σ∗] there is a payoﬀ equivalent
no communication contract [˜ ω,˜ σ∗].
Proof. First note that in a termination contract on the equilibrium path the Agent’s actions
are independent of the messages mt. Having the Agent completely uninformed does not give the
Principal any proﬁtable deviation possibilities so he will still follow the original termination rule
{a}. Finally, if for every message mt that the Agent could have received, he chose to exert eﬀort
that means that if now he has no message on which to condition his action he would still choose to
exert eﬀort.
13Theorem 1 Given any contract (ω,σω) that generates values V and F,w ec a nc o n s t r u c tap a y o ﬀ
equivalent contract (ˆ ω,ˆ σω) with the following properties:
(i) The Agent receives a constant wage until he is ﬁred and no bonuses.
(ii) The Agent exerts eﬀort every period until he is ﬁred.
(iii) The Principal gives no feedback (sends no messages) to the Agent.
Proof. Properties (i) and (ii) follow from applying successively Lemmas (4), (5) and (6). Given
properties (i) and (ii) Lemma (7) delivers property (iii).
This strong result provides a possible explanation for the high degree of wage compression ob-
served. It shows that for any contract there is a payoﬀ equivalent contract that eliminates the
need for bonuses. Incentives for the agents to exert eﬀort is instead provided via eﬃciency wages
and the threat of termination. Also worth remarking is the fact that Principal need not give any
informative feedback to the Agent about his performance.
4T h e ﬁnite horizon case
In this section we ﬁrst show that if we requiere budget balance there is no enforceable contract
that can provide incentives for the Agent to exert eﬀort. Having established this result we then
characterize the optimal contract when money burning is allowed.
Proposition 2 If T =1 ,σ ∗
ω is essentially unique and it has e(ω)=0and m(y) such that
b(m)=0 .18
Furthermore, for any ﬁnite T the the game has as a unique equilibrium the repetion of the
equilibrium for when T =1as a result of unravelling.
Proof. When T =1 , since this is the last period of the game, the continuation values for both,
the Agent and the Principal, solely consists on the current compensation. By Lemma 3 the total
compensation the Principal pays must be the same for either realization of output. Hence, providing
incentives for the Agent to exert eﬀort, which requires compensation to be dependent on the output,
is not possible.
Next consider any arbitrary ﬁnite horizon. Suppose there exists a contract that contemplates
the Agent exerting eﬀort in some periods. Consider the last period in which the Agent is supposed
to exert eﬀort. By the arguments given to prove the case T =1it follows that incentives cannot
be provided to exert eﬀort for this last period hence contradicting the claim that there can be a
contract for ﬁnite T in which eﬀort is exerted.
18"Essentially" since there could be more than one m such that b(m)=0 .
14If there is no remaining surplus in the relationship, incentives for eﬀo r tc a n n o tb ep r o v i d e d
because there is no way to burn resources in case of failure. Hence, we cannot provide contingent
pay for the Agent leaving the Principal indiﬀerent as required by Proposition 1.
To get around these negative results, MacLeod (2003) considered the possibility of having the
wage being paid by the Principal diﬀer from that recieved by the Agent, the diﬀerence between the
two being burnt. He motivates his use of money burning as a shortcut to account for conﬂict in
organizations (ineﬃcient play in the continuation game if the game were to be repeated).19 Actual
money burning is also sometimes used. For example, some baseball teams have the ability to ﬁne
their players but the money collected from these ﬁnes is not pocketed by the club but rather given
away to charity.20 For the remainder of the section we deﬁne wP and wA as, respectively, the wage
paid by the Principal and the amount the Agent receives.
In order to characterize the optimal contract with money burning we ﬁrst show that without
loss of generality we can focus on contracts in which wages are only paid in the last period and the
Agent is to exert eﬀort every period.
Lemma 8 All payments and money burning can be done in the last period.
Proof. Suppose that after some history hV
t−1 × mt × [0,1] ap a y m e n tw
p
t was to be made by the
Principal and wA
t ≤ wP





δT−t and the Agent receiving
wA
t
δT−t with the diﬀerence, if any, being burnt at time T.
Lemma 9 For every contract with V + F>0 there is a payoﬀ equivalent contract in which the
Agent exerts eﬀort in every period.
Proof. Follows from Lemma (6) and noting that the destruction of value that can be achieved by
termination can also be achieved by burning money.
These results are important for two reasons. First, when no bounds are placed on the amount
of money burning allowed, it is suﬃcient to look at contracts with no termination. Destruction
of value, if necessary, can be done via money burning. Second, since wage payments and money
burning can be left for the last period, the Agent can be kept completely uninformed of the interim
realizations of output. In this case, the Agent’s dynamic problem of deciding in which periods to
exert eﬀort is identical to a static multitasking problem.
19MacLeod (2003 pp217): "These costs are generated when individuals either leave the relationship or carry out
ineﬃcient actions for several periods..."
20We thank Jon Levin for providing this example.
15We make use of the static multitasking representation to characterize a contract that minimizes
the amount of resources burnt (that maximizes surplus). The amount of resources burnt after a
outcome sequence yT will be denoted by Z
¡
yT¢




to denote the probability
that outcome sequence yT is realized conditional on the column vector of eﬀort choices e.21 We use
L to denote a vector of low outcome realizations. Finally we deﬁne c as the row vector of eﬀort
costs where the ith element is given by δi−1c.























Furthermore, when δ =1 , this is the only optimal contract.
Proof. The proof to the ﬁrst part of the Proposition is organized in four steps. First we write
the problem, then we write a relaxed problem where only one-step deviations by the Agent are
considered. The third step solves the relaxed problem and the last step proves that this is also a
solution to the original problem.
i) To motivate eﬀort for T +1periods which we denote e∗, we face the following money burning
minimization problem:
min

























≥ 0 ∀yT .
Note that the Principal’s incentive constraints are satiﬁed by construction since wP is ﬁxed.
21We denote vectors in bold.
16ii) Instead of solving this problem directly, we ﬁrst solve a relaxed problem in which we only
consider one-step deviations by the Agent:
min

















P (yt|et =1 )− P (yt|et =0 )
P (yt|et =1 )
¶




≥ 0 ∀yT .
From (5) it is clear that in order to provide incentives in period t, we need:
µ
P (yt|et =1 )− P (yt|et =0 )
P (yt|et =1 )
¶
< 0 .
In words, to provide incentives for eﬀort in period t we need to have burning if the outcome of that














Clearly t =0is the most binding constraint if δ<1 which puts a lower bound on the necessary
expected money burning c
(1−p)
(p−q).




δT(p−q)(1−p)T if yT = L
0 otherwise
)






















iv) We now show that Z∗ is also a solution to the original problem.
Using Z∗, the constraints of the original problem (4) take the following form:
c.(e∗−e)+
c








≤ 0 ∀e ∈{0,1}
T+1 .
Letting n denote the number of periods the Agent deviates we can write the term that captures
the expected cost of deviation as follows:
17c




T+1 − (1 − p)




Now suppose the Agent was deviating in n − 1 periods and now deviates for n periods. The












> 1 the increase in the probability of punishment from an additional deviation is
increasing in the number of previous deviations. Hence, if the Agent doesn’t ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
deviate once, he won’t want to deviate at all. Given δ<1 and Z∗, t h em o s tp r o ﬁtable single
d e v i a t i o ni si nt h eﬁrst period. This is not proﬁtable by step (iii).
Finally, the conditions for wP guarantee that individual rationality constraints are satisﬁed so
the players sign the contract ω at time zero.
The uniqueness proof for the case when δ =1can be found in the Appendix.
Although the form of optimal contract characterized with a two-step function appears to relate
closely to that described in Proposition 6 of MacLeod (2003) it is worth pointing out that it provides
av e r yd i ﬀerent insight for pay compression than that observed in a one-shot game. The fact that
money burning only occurs after the worst possible history is the combined result of two factors.
First, note that burning money after a history that has yt = H for some t is providing incentives
for the Agent to shirk in period t. The only history that does not provide these perverse incentives
is yT = L. Second, although burning period by period as failures occur would also be an alternative
that does not provide incentives for shirking, it is not optimal. We might be tempted to think that
determining burning on the joint outcome of two periods is benetial since it reduces the likelihood
of burning. Although the likelihood of punishment occuring eﬀectively decreases, the amount to be
burnt when it occurs is simultaneously and proportionally increasing, eroding away all the gains
from the lower frequency of occurrence.
The actual reason for pooling periods together, which follows from Corollary 2 below, is that the
expected cost to motivate eﬀort is independent of the horizon. Therefore, it is optimal to pool all
the periods together in order to pay this cost only once.
Corollary 2 The expected present value cost to motivate eﬀort is given by c
(1−p)
(p−q). It is independent
of both T and δ.
The intuition behind this Corollary is as follows. In the proof of the Propositon we have shown
that the only binding constraint is the one for eﬀort in the ﬁrst period. Since, the cost of the
18ﬁrst period’s eﬀort, is not discounted by δ, varying δ has no eﬀect. The invariance with respect to
T also follows from there only being one constraint binding in the optimal contract. Since using
Z∗ once we provide incentives for the Agent not to shirk in the ﬁrst period, the constraints of the
remaining periods are automatically satisﬁed. As mentioned before, the likelihood that burning
takes place decreases in T but exactly oﬀsetting this eﬀect is the fact that, when required, there
will be more burning with larger T. The intuition for this is that the less the Agent believes that
the ﬁrst period’s outcome is pivotal in triggering the punishment, the harsher the punishment must
be to prevent him from shirking.
Comparative static results on the expected present-value cost to motivate eﬀort are straightfor-
ward and intuitive. First, the lower the cost of eﬀort the lower the ineﬃciency. If it is not too
costly for the Agent to exert eﬀort, then it is easier to provide incentives. Next, the smaller the
diﬀerence in the probabilities of success conditional on exerting or not eﬀort (p − q), the harder it
is to provide incentives for the Agent. As p−q gets smaller, the outcomes observed if he shirks are
closer to the ones if he doesn’t, hence there is little reward for his eﬀort and therefore it is hard
to provide incentives. On the other hand as p increases the probability that the Agent fails in the
ﬁrst period if he exerts eﬀort decreases and hence there will be less burning in expectation. When
p =1there is no ineﬃciency incurred since on the equilibrium path yT = L is never observed.
Comparing the ineﬃciency of the optimal contract relative to the ﬁr s tb e s tw ec a ns e et h a tt h e
only other case in which this contract approximates ﬁr s tb e s ti si fb o t hδ → 1 and T →∞ . For all
other cases, eﬃciency is bounded away from the ﬁrst best. Intuitively this follows because the cost
of inducing eﬀort is independent of both Ta n dδand as we take the value of the relationship to
∞ this cost becomes insigniﬁcant in relative terms.







If the condition above is not met providing incentives for the Agent to exert eﬀort would deliver
a negative surplus. A potential resolution to this problem using tournaments is discussed in Section
6.
We have shown that for the construction of the optimal contract, communication was not neces-
sary. The following Proposition strengthens this result by showing that any feedback reduces the
achievable eﬃciency.
Proposition 4 (No Feedback) When δ =1 , the optimal contract is not implementable if the
Principal sends informative messages to the Agent.
19Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition for the result is clear, revealing information to the Agent has no advantage and it
increases the amount of incentive constraints the Principal needs to worry about. When δ<1 since
all but the ﬁrst constraint are slack, the Principal could send some very uninformative messages
to the Agent and still be able to implement the optimal contract. When δ =1on the other hand,
there are no slack constraints and any information would reduce eﬃciency because the optimal
contract would cease to be incentive compatible.
When we analyze the limit of the ﬁnite horizon economies as T →∞the problem has no solution
if we allow for arbitrary amounts of money burning. As T →∞ , the optimal contract calls for
burning inﬁnite amounts inﬁnitely far in the future. Therefore, we need to establish some bound on
the amount of money that can be burnt. The most natural way we see to do this is to determine it
endogenously. We achieve this objective by limiting the amount of value that can be burnt to the
potential surplus in the relationship. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, a motivation for the use
of money burning has been the cost of conﬂicts between Agents and Principals. Leaving potential
sabotages aside, the termination of a relationship seems to be a natural way in which to account
for these costs. In the next section we show though that using money burning as a shortcut to
represent the destruction of value in an inﬁnitely repeated game is only appropriate when we focus
on a class of contracts called T-Period Review contracts. When looking at the optimal equilibria
of the inﬁnitely repeated game several new issues arise that are not present in the ﬁnite horizon
model. In particular, since now the Agent has to receive some information in ﬁnite time, we must
take into account that the timing of punishments also induces the Agent to learn and potentially
makes providing incentives harder in the future. Also, the Agent might have incentives to deviate
in order to learn about the Principal’s private information.
5T h e i n ﬁnite Horizon case
Analyzing the inﬁnite horizon version of the game presents a great challenge. The reason is that
this is a game with private monitoring and, as pointed out by Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and
further discussed in Kandori (2002), private monitoring games lack a tractable recursive structure.22
Hence, characterizing the equilibrium value set of inﬁnitely repeated Private Monitoring Games is
an objective that has not yet been achieved. A further complication related to the lack of a recursive
structure is that when analyzing a candidate equilibrium it is not in general suﬃcient to consider
only one-step deviations. This hinders any attempt at solving the problem in a direct way using
Lagrangean methods. For these reasons, most of the papers in the area have focused on proving
22Kandori (2002) is the introductory article to a special edition of The Journal of Economic Theory on Private
Monitoring Games.
20Folk Theorems and there has been little or no progress in characterizing optimal equilibria for
δ< <1.
To avoid these diﬃculties, Levin (2003) focuses his analysis on equilibria with the ‘Full Review
Property’. This condition requieres that the Principal reveal to the Agent what he observed after
each period. We relax this condition and consider a class of equilibria in which the Principal
only reveals his private information at ﬁxed intervals of length T. Furthermore, T is endogenously
determined. We label the contracts with this property T-period review contracts. We show in
Section 5.1 that using these contracts we are able to truncate the private histories and give the
problem a simple recursive representation. An important property of these contracts is that the
attainable per-period average payoﬀs approximate ﬁrst best as δ → 1.
Although these contracts are asymptotically optimal as δ → 1, they are generally not optimal
for δ< <1. The Principal could provide incentives at a lower cost if instead of forgetting the past
history after the Agent moves into a new review period he kept an account of it. Once we allow
for this the problem becomes much more complex. W el o s et h er e c u r s i v er e p r e s e n t a t i o na n dw e
can no longer rule out multiple deviations by the Agent. In Section 5.2 we build on our results
from Section 3 characterizing further the optimal contract. We return in this section to the original
model in which we do not allow for exogenous money burning.
5.1 Review Contracts
A T-period review contract can be described as follows: after the predetermined review length
T, the Principal evaluates the Agent’s performance. If the performance is favorable, the Agent is
oﬀered employment with a clear record at T +1. If performance is not satisfactory, then the Agent
is ﬁr e dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yβ. If he is not ﬁred, he is also oﬀered employment with a clear record at
T +1 . Thus the game is partioned into independent review periods.
Within the literature on private monitoring games, similar type of equilibria appear in Compte
(1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998). A similar construction appears in Abreu, Milgrom and
Pearce (1991), who study the timing of information revelation in an imperfect public monitoring
environment. An important diﬀerence is that in Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) the information
is released by a third party and hence, there are no incentive compatibility considerations regarding
the veracity of the reports in their analysis.
We start our analysis with one-period review contracts and then extend it to the T-period
case.23 Within this family of contracts we are able to obtain arbitrarily eﬃcient contracts as δ → 1.
23The one-period review contracts analyzed are very closely related to the contracts with the ‘Full Review Property’
in Levin (2003).
21The T-period review contracts can also be thought of as a repetition of a T period game with
money burning, where there is a limited amount of money that can be burnt. Another of the
simpliﬁcations that the T-period structure gives us is that there are predetermined dates for the
release of information. Recall that in the ﬁnite-horizon game there was no release of information
untill the end, this of course cannot be true in an inﬁnite horizon game. The question therefore arises
of when is the best time to release information to the Agent. The longer the horizon the greater
the eﬃciency, but the more that needs to be burnt if required. Since this amount is endogenously
bounded, it in turn sets an endogenous bound on the review length.
5.1.1 One-period Review Contracts
Consider the following candidate equilibrium of the post-contractual game. The Agent exerts high
eﬀort with certainty in the ﬁrst period and is paid the expected output w = pH +( 1− p)L.I f
the Principal observes H, we move on to the next period, where the game starts over as before.
If the principal instead observes L, with probability β he ﬁres the Agent.24, 25 For this to be an
equilibrium we must ensure that the Principal and the Agent are playing mutual best responses
conditional on their information.
The Principal’s strategy is a best response given the Agent’s strategy and his information. This
follows as the Principal’s continuation value if he doesn’t ﬁre the Agent is always zero since the
wage equals the expected output. Hence, he has no incentives to deviate either by terminating the
Agent when the output is high or not terminating him when its low.
It is incentive compatible for the agent to exert high eﬀort if:




1 − δ (1 − β (1 − p))
.
That is, the increase in the probability of a good outcome times the compensation diﬀerential
has to be greater or equal than the cost of eﬀort. Also, note that βV n o wt a k e st h er o l et h a tZ
h a di nt h eﬁnite horizon model. This constraint holds with equality in an optimal review contract
24Up to interger constraints this is equivalent to considering that for the next k periods the agent puts low eﬀort
and the principal pays no wage. After the k periods are over, the game restarts with the agent again exerting high
eﬀort.
25I tc a ne a s i l yb es h o w nt h a ti na no p t i m a lr e v i e wc o n t r a c tt h er e l a t i o n s h i pw o u l dn e v e rb et e r m i n a t e da f t e ra
good realization. Hence, we just consider the probability of termination after a bad realization.












As o l u t i o ne x i s t si ﬀ the denominator is positive and δ is close enough to one to guarantee 0 ≤ β ≤





This is the same condition that was necessary in Section 4 to have a positive level of eﬀort when
money burning was allowed and T =1 .
Deﬁnition 9 The ineﬃciency λ ∈ [0,1] of an implementable contract, is deﬁned by the value V it




Since β → 0 as δ → 1 we could be tempted to think that the ineﬃciency is ruled out in the






Hence, when restricting ourselves to the one-period review contracts, once players are patient
enough so that the contract is implementable, there are no further eﬃciency gains from having even
more patient players. This is because although at each stage termination is less likely, the players
care more and more about the future and these eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other.
For the special case p =1 , the one period review contract achieves ﬁrst best. This result can be
related to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). They use one-period review contracts in which the Agent
gets all the surplus to derive a theory for eﬃciency wages and involuntary unemployment. They
don’t prove that this type of contract is optimal. Instead, they claim that other types of contracts,
such as having bond posting by the Agent, could be hard to implement because “the ﬁrm could
have an incentive to claim the worker shirked to claim the bond”. In this paper we rigorously show
that the one-period review contract is actually optimal over all contracts for the special case they
analyze.
235.1.2 T-period Review Contracts
From our analysis of the optimal contract in a ﬁnite-horizon game with money burning we know
that there are gains from grouping periods together since the expected cost to motivate eﬀort is
independent of the horizon. That intuition holds true here. However, given that value burning is
now endogenously determined (instead of unlimited money burning) there will be an endogenous
bound on the review length.
We focus on a particular type of contract that pays a ﬁxed wage every period w = pH+(1− p)L
while the Agent is employed. Every T periods the Principal evaluates the Agent. If the output in
all the T periods under review has been low, he terminates the relationship with probability βT.
This type of contract is very convenient for tractability reasons, since, as we show in the following
Lemma, we only need to check one incentive compatibility constraint for the Agent.
Lemma 10 With a T-period review contract, if it is not proﬁtable for the Agent to deviate by
exerting low eﬀort in the ﬁrst period, then there are no proﬁtable deviations for the Agent.
Proof. Follows the same arguments as Part (iv) of Proposition 3.
The IC constraint for the Agent in the T-period review contract boils down to:
δT−1 (1 − p)
T−1 (p − q)(δβV) ≥ c. (ICA T)





1 − β (1 − p)
T
´





Note that the constraint (ICAT) looks identical to the one we had for the one-period review case
except for the ﬁrst two terms in the left hand side. The ﬁrst term simply reﬂects the discounting
and the second is the probability that the Agent’s decision to put eﬀort in the ﬁrst period is actually
relevant. Furthermore, these terms are decreasing in T, tightening the constraint. Oﬀsetting this
eﬀect is the fact that V is increasing in T.
The constraint (ICA T) can alternatively be expressed as follows:
c +( 1− p)
T (q − p)
(1 − p)
δTβV ≤ 0 .
24This way it closely resembles what we saw in Section 4. Except that now, the term (βV) plays
t h er o l eo fZ, the amount of money burning.





1 − δT .
Deﬁning the value in this way highlights the similarity to a repeated T-period money burning
problem. It also shows why implementing the longest possible review length is optimal.26 The
review length will be bounded by the need to have β ≤ 1. As we did for the one-period review


















This simply establishes that in period T there is something positive to be burnt. Of course
this alone is not suﬃcient since the exact amount to be burnt depends as well on all the other
parameters. In particular note that as players are more patient longer and longer review lengths
can be implemented. Furthermore, as long as the per period surplus is positive (s>0) if players
are very patient, then an inplementable contract always exists as shown in the following Lemma.
Lemma 11 In any relationship with positive surplus s>0 as we let δ → 1 t h e r ei ss o m er e v i e w
length T large enough such that high eﬀort is implementable.




T . Since the
left hand side is a positive number we can always ﬁnd a large enough T so that the condition is
satisﬁed. Note as well that for any ﬁxed T as δ → 1, β → 0 so there is a feasible β∗ to implement
the contract.
Conditional on the contract being implementable, the ineﬃciency λT is given by:
26The (ICAT) constraint allows us to conjecture that if we allowed for limited amounts money burning, both
instruments would play the same role in the provision of incentives. Furthermore, that they would be used together







We can see from (8) that the same forces that were present in determining the ineﬃciency in the
ﬁnite horizon play a role here. Additionally, the fact that we limit the amount of resources that
can be burnt to the surplus in the relationship makes the ineﬃciency a function of the surplus that
can be generated during the length of the review. As the per period surplus increases or as we are
able to increase the review length, we are able to reduce the ineﬃciency. In particular, as δ → 1
we can make λT → 0 since as δ → 1 we can take T →∞and therefore ST →∞ . The Theorem
below formalizes this result.
Theorem 2 (Folk Theorem) For any ε>0 and s>0, there exists a δ∗ < 1 such that for all
δ>δ ∗ we can construct a T (ε,s) period review contract which is implementable and has less than
ε ineﬃciency.











(p − q)T (ε,s)s




Therefore the ineﬃciency is:
λT =
c(1 − p)




ε(p−q)s (p − q)s
= ε
We can relate this result back to the characterization of the optimal contract with money burning.
As δ → 1 the future value of the relationship grows and hence, the constraint that having the amount
of burning endogenously determined by the future surplus of the relationship becomes weaker and
weaker. Hence, as it was the case for the ﬁnite horizon with T →∞ , we want to drive the review
time as far out in the future as possible and only terminate after the worst history.
Although the T-period review contracts are very convenient to analyze and asymptotically ef-
ﬁcient, for δ<1 they are not optimal. Having a ﬁxed and predetermined review length and
forgetting about the past will not be optimal when δ<1. In the following Section we proceed to
characterize the unrestricted optimal contract.
265.2 Partial Characterization of the Optimal Contract
From Theorem 1 in Section 3 we know that the highest achivable surplus, can be obtained with a
contract in which:
• The Agent exerts eﬀort until he is ﬁred.
• The Principal pays the Agent a constant wage equal to the expected output.
• No informative messages are sent to the Agent about his past performance.
As previously shown, this type of contract takes care of the Principal’s incentive constraints.
Incentives for the Agent are provided through the Principal’s threat to terminate the relationship
if the output sequence is indicative of cheating by the Agent. Optimality requires the minimum
possible amount of termination that will provide incentives for the Agent to exert eﬀort.
The Principal chooses a sequence of history dependent functions a
¡
ht¢
that determine the proba-
bility with which the relationship is continued after history ht = {yt}. The Agent on the other hand
chooses a sequence of eﬀort choices {et}
∞
t=0 that maximize his expected value. We use hτ ⊆ ht to
denote initial subhistories of length τ of a longer history ht. We use p
¡
ht¢
to denote the probability
that a given history is realized.
The objective is to maximize expected surplus conditional on the Agent exerting eﬀort every
period. Formally, the problem can be stated as follows:









































The following Proposition provides a partial characterization of the optimal contract using vari-
ational arguments.27 We use the notation
¡
ht,h j¢
to represent the history ht+j where ﬁrst ht was









27As mentioned before, the problem above is too complex to use Lagrangean methods.





t=0 that does not have the following prop-
erties, can be weakly improved upon.


















(iii) For all ht × hj, if a
¡
ht,H,h j¢











(v) For all t, if a
¡
Lt¢

























We will prove part (i) below to illustrate the method of proof. The rest of the proofs can be





t=0 impacts incentives in two ways. First, it
aﬀects the incentives of all previous periods through the eﬀect the change has on the continuation
values. Second, it impacts all future periods incentive constraints because the change aﬀects the

















− ε ≥ 0







































ε. We must make sure
these changes respect two constrains: ﬁrst the expected values at time t must not be changed. This
















































Second, the probability distribution on the tree is unaﬀected so all incentive constraints for
periods after t +1are unaﬀected.


























the Agent now has more incentives to exert eﬀort at
t +1 .
Parts (i) & (iv) of the the Proposition establish a partial ordering of the outcome histories.
Essentially, for two histories ht and ˜ ht,i fh t element wise dominates ˜ ht (i.e. if for all τ ≤ t















=0 . Part (vii) states that an Agent who has no future would rather
be ﬁred immediately than kept for an additional period. This result would be natural if the Agent
knew he had no future. On the other hand, when he doesn’t know his standing, we could have
thought that keeping him one more period could be useful because he generates one more period
worth of surplus. This is shown not to be the case.
6 Organizational Design: Optimal Contracts with a Third Party
So far we have only considered the contractual possibilities between a single Agent and a single
Principal. In this section we show that if there were other parties available, there could be more
eﬃcient ways in which to organize production. There are two organizational design solutions we
would like to highlight. The ﬁrst is the use of tournaments. The second is the role of hierarchies
within an organization. Our goal in this section is not to provide a rigorous and exhaustive analysis
of the topics discussed, but rather to highlight that our model can also help explain certain common
features in organizations.
6.1 Tournaments
The role of tournaments as an incentive device for the agents has been largely studied in the liter-
ature starting with the seminal paper of Lazear and Rosen (1981). The literature on tournaments
has generally assumed that output is contractable. By changing that assumption, this paper high-
lights a virtue of tournaments that, with the exception of Malcomson (1984), has not received
much attention in the past. The tournament structure allows for contracts that provide a constant
continuation value for the Principal for all output realizations and upward-sloping schedules for the
Agents without burning any surplus.
Suppose the Principal can commit to give a prize b to the best performing Agent every period
(or randomize in case of a draw). This way the Principal has no more constraints since he has to
give a prize to some player but is really indiﬀerent about which Agent he gives it to. The Agents
have incentives exert high eﬀort in order to win the prize.





b − c ≥ 0
The term multiplying the bonus is by assumption positive hence we can always ﬁnd a bonus big
enough to provide incentives for the Agents to exert high eﬀort. Note that this might require the
base wage to be negative depending on how much of the surplus is captured by the Principal and
how much by the Agents.
Tournaments themselves are in turn susceptible to other problems. Examples of these shortcom-
ings include: the Agents colluding against the Principal or the Principal colluding with one of the
Agents against the other. The Agents might also engage in unproductive activities to try to win
over the Principal’s favor or directly to try to undermine the other Agent’s work. Therefore, we
would expect to observe tournaments in environments in which the information problem is of more
importance than these other concerns.
6.2 Hierarchies:
There are many potential explanations for the existence of hierarchies in organizations. In this
section we point out that an additional advantage of such structures is that they serve to mitigate
the incentives problems when the Principal observes output privately.
Suppose the Principal could hire an additional employee. This employee, the Supervisor, eval-
uates the Agent’s performance and determines his wage. She, in turn, earns a ﬁxed wage. Given
that her wage is independent of the performance rating she assigns, the Agent believes she will
report honestly and there will be no more need to destroy value. Of course, issues such as the
Agent or the Principal trying to bribe the Supervisor could arise in this environment and would
need to be prevented with appropriate devices. Also, a wage needs to be paid to the Supervisor
reducing the surplus left for the Agent and Principal to share. The point, nonetheless, is that the
use of hierarchical systems with those above determining the bonuses of those immediately below
could be a way to address the combined incentives problems present when the Agent’s output is
privately observed by its Supervisor.
7 Extensions: Stochastic Eﬀort and Communication
In the contracts we have analyzed so far, the Principal has been doing all the monitoring. The
continuation values are conditional only on his observations. We might think there is potential to
grant some monitoring power to the Agent. If the Agent follows a mixed strategy for eﬀort, he
would have private information on what the outcome distribution should look like. This information
can then be compared to the Principal’s output reports. We could conjecture that this might lead
30to an improvement. Although a complete analysis of these issues is left for future work we want to
provide two results of interest illustrating whether this is or not the case.
We ﬁrst prove a negative result showing that within the framework of our model and focusing
on one-period review contracts it is optimal to have the Agent exert high eﬀort deterministically.
Proposition 6 Allowing for contracts in which the Agent randomizes and the continuation values
are determined as a function of the simultaneous announcements by the Agent and the Principal
does not provide any improvement over the one-period review contract in which the Agent exerts
high eﬀort deterministically.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind this negative result is that when the Agent mixes, the Principal actually
has more incentives to claim L instead of H. This follows from the fact that the Principal cannot
be punished for claiming low output if eﬀort was low. Therefore, when the Principal observes H he
knows there is some probability that the Agent had actually done low eﬀort and hence that his lie
will go unpunished. This intuition would seem to generalize when considering arbitrary contracts.
If instead the model allowed for an ineﬃciently high eﬀort level, then things could work diﬀerently.
Consider for simplicity the case in which if the Agent exerts a very high eﬀort, then output is high
for sure. Now, let the Agent mix between the eﬃcient eﬀort level and this higher eﬀort level. The
Principal is now more scared to declare L when H was realized. He knows that there is a chance
that the Agent exerted the very high eﬀort level and, that if this is the case, he would be caught
lying if he claimed L. In Appendix A we provide an example that illustrates this point and shows
how the Agent can use mixing to a higher eﬀort level to monitor the Principal.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
Relaxing the assumption that output is common knowledge, we were able to explain many features
of the labor markets that were at odds with the literature. In particular, we have provided a
rationale for the observed wage compression and the use of eﬃciency wages together with the
threat of termination to provide incentives.
This information structure can also be used to better understand questions of organizational
design and potentially the theory of the ﬁrm. In particular we described how having diﬀerent
hierarchies or setting up tournaments can be used to simultaneously provide incentives for the
Agents to exert eﬀort and for the principal to be truthful.
31Additionally our paper has provided a useful benchmark in which there is no need for the use
of communication between Agents and principals. An important avenue for future research is to
explore further possible reasons for the existence of communication. As shown in the appendix
a possible solution might come from allowing the Agent to monitor the principal by randomizing
his eﬀo r tc h o i c et oi n e ﬃciently high eﬀort levels. Alternatively, the existence of match-speciﬁc
productivity parameters might provide a rationale for communication. We hope to address these
issues in future research.
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349A p p e n d i x A
9.1 No Mixing No Talking
Consider the following one period review contract with random eﬀort. The Agent plays e =1with
probability α ∈ (0,1), the Principal then observes the output and they simultaneously announce
the actual eﬀort and the actual output.
The following table summarizes the parameters (other than α ) of the self-enforcing contract
conditional on the announcements.





Continuation Values (including wages not including cost of eﬀort)
Principal y = L y = H
e =1 F1L F1H
e =0 F0L F0H
Agent y = L y = H
e =1 V1L V1H
e =0 V0L V0H
In order to simplify our analysis and exposition, we deﬁnie the following new variables:
∆1 = α(F1H − F1L)
∆0 =( 1− α)(F0L − F0H)
∆L = V1L − V0L
∆H = V1H − V0H
∆cross = V1H − V0L
For the Principal we have the following truth-telling constraints:





































These constraints imply that ∆0,∆1 ≥ 0
For the Agent we have the following two truth-telling constraints:










We also need the Agent to be indiﬀerent between high and low eﬀort
∆H =























Note that (AIC) has always a slope between (ATT0) and (ATT1).
36With these preliminaries, we now prove Proposition13 from the text.
Proposition 13 Allowing for contracts in which the Agent randomizes and the continuation
values are determined as a function of the simultaneous announcements by the Agent and the
Principal does not provide any improvement over the one-period review contract in which the
Agent exerts high eﬀort deterministically.
Proof. Suppose that the optimal contract has α<1 and ∆1and ∆0 > 0 and that (PTTH) does
not bind. Now consider the following: decrease w1L and β1L and increase w1H. We can do this such
a way that the resulting increase in V1H is equal to
1−p
p times the decrease in V1L.As a result, the
Agent’s IC constraints continue to hold and the truthtelling constraints are relaxed. The decrease in
β1L implies an improvement in eﬃciency since there will be less value burning. Therefore, (PTTH)
must be binding in the optimal contract.
Now suppose that(PTTH) binds, but that (PTTL) does not bind. If we could decrease.∆0
we would relax (PTTH) and improve. This can be achieved by simply increasing α. Changing α
has no impact on the Agent’s constraints, it relaxes (PTTH) and we can do it till (PTTL) starts
binding. If we iterate between this two steps (see graph below) clearly we can drive ∆1and ∆0 all
the way to zero. This means that either α =1or that (F0L − F0H)=( F1H − F1L)=0but if this

























↓w1L ↓ β1L and  ↑w1H
Mixing by the Agent fails as means to relax the Principal’s truthtelling constraints when he
observes a high realization of outcome. The intuition behind this negative result is that when the
Agent mixes the Principal is actually getting some slack from claiming y = L when y = H. This is
because there is some chance that the Agent had actually done low eﬀort and the Principal cannot
be punished for claiming L when no eﬀort eﬀort was exerted. If instead we allowed the Agent to
mix a higher eﬀort level (even if it were inneﬁcient from a productive perspective) then mixing
might work. We illustrate this with an example in the next section.
379.2 Monitoring with high Eﬀort
Suppose that the Agent could additionally choose to exert a higher eﬀort level. If this eﬀort level
leads to high outcome with higher probability, mixing by the Agent to this higher eﬀort level relaxes
the Principal’s truth-telling constraints. The intuition for this is clearer when we consider the case
in which very high eﬀort leads to a high output for sure. Suppose the Agent mixes between these
two eﬀort levels, when the Principal observes high output he is now less tempted to claim low. He
fears that the Agent might have exerted very high eﬀort and that he would be caught lying if he
did.
To illustrate more precisely how this works consider the following example: let e = {l,m,h} and
c(e)={0,c,1} with p(e)={0,p,1} respectively.28 H =1and L =0 . Medium eﬀort is the only
productively eﬃcient eﬀort level p − c>0.
Suppose we wish to have the Agent mix between high and medium eﬀort and we allow continu-
ation values including wages to depend on the simultaneous announcements. Denote these by V˜ e, ˜ y
for the Agent and F˜ e, ˜ y for the Principal. We face the following constraints:
For the Agent:
Thruthtelling:
Given he exerted m eﬀort:
pVmH +( 1− p)VmL ≥ pVhH +( 1− p)VhL
Given he exerted h eﬀort:
VhH ≥ VmH
Incentive compatibility for mixing:
pVmH +( 1− p)VmL − c = VhH − 1 ≥ VmL
For the Principal:
Thruthtelling:
Given he observed L:
FmL ≥ FmH (TTL)
28Similar examples could be constructed for less extreme cases, we pick these parameters for expositional conve-
nience.
38Given he observed H:
αFhH +( 1− α)pFmH ≥ αFhL +( 1− α)pFmL (TTH)
Consider a contract in which the Principal gets all the residual surplus.
Announcements Wage Termination Probability
(m,L) wmL =0 βmL =0
(m,H) wmH = c
p βmH =0
(h,L) whL = −
p
1−p βhL =1
(h,H) whH =1 βhH =0
The Agent has no incentives to deviate since when he is called to exert high eﬀort he is compen-
sated for sure with the cost he had to bare. When he is called to do medium eﬀort he gets zero if
he obeys. If he chooses to exert low eﬀort the best he can get is also a payoﬀ of zero.
We must now make sure that the Principal does not have incentives to claim L when he observes





















δ ((1 − α)(p − c))
1 − δ
¶
We will use the following parameter values to illustrate the example: p = 1
2,δ= .9 and c = 1
8. Using














is a solution to this, but since m is more productive than h, it is optimal to pick
α = 1
9. In this case we get a total expected surplus of 31
3.The First Best surplus is 15
4 =3 .75 and with
the deterministic one-period review contract using our results from Section 5.1.1 we get an expected
surplus of only 2
3FB=2 .5.This example shows that when considering a more general model, with
many possible eﬀort choices, ruling out mixed strategies by the Agent and communication might
reduce eﬃciency.
29It is easily veriﬁed that (TTL) is satisﬁed.
3910 Appendix B
P r o o fo fu n i q u e n e s sf o rP r o p o s i t i o n3








otherwise Z∗ would imply strictly less expected money burnt.
Denote all histories yT 6= L for which Z
¡
yT¢








otherwise, the Agent would deviate in the ﬁrst period. Hence,
if Z i st ob eo p t i m a li tm u s tb et h a tt h e r ei ss o m e˙ yT. Suppose there is one such ˙ yT.L e t j












































This is the IC for period 0 eﬀort. Note this implies that Z cannot be incentive compatible since







and additionally, the last
term in the left hand side of the inequality is positive. Therefore, Z∗ i st h eo n l yc o n t r a c tt h a ti s
optimal for all δ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Proof. All of the Agent’s IC constraints are holding with equality when he is completely unin-
formed. As soon as he can condition on any information, the probability he assigns to his eﬀort
being pivotal in any given period would change. Some IC constraints would therefore be violated
when he updates this probability given the messages.





t=0 that does not
have each of the following properties, can be weakly improved upon.


















(iii) For all ht × hj, if a
¡
ht,H,h j¢











(v) For all t, if a
¡
Lt¢

























Proof. (i) See the main text.




(iii) Suppose ∃ ht,h j s.t. a
¡
ht,H,h j¢
< 1 and a
¡
ht,L,h j¢

















Agent accordingly. Let ˜ a
¡
ht,L,h j¢














































































This choice of ˜ a
¡
ht,L,h j¢
also leaves the continuation value V
¡
ht¢
constant assuring that IC
constraints for τ ≤ t are unaﬀected. Incentive constraints between t +2and t + j +1are not









decreased as a result of these changes so
incentives in period t +1have been relaxed. This implies at least a weak improvement can be
achieved.
(iv) & (v) Follow from the proof of (iii)
























































− ε for some small




after ht let the Principal pretend that all other histories ˜ ht
occurred where the relative weights are given according to the likelihood of each alternative history
˜ ht occurring on the equilibrium path. γ must also be chosen so that the value after ht is kept
constant. This change has kept values constant so past IC are still satisﬁed. The only change that
we have made is to increase the probability that when deciding eﬀort at t+1the Agent is somewhere
in the outcome tree where the current outcome realization aﬀects his continuation value. Therefore,
the incentive constraint for eﬀort at t +1has been relaxed. Incentives in all future periods are
unaﬀected since the Agent’s beliefs are the same that under the original contract.
42